{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-02-000010","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/gershkov-bic-dic-lean/tree/0e1bed171ab66b194d5ee28ac02818b9a7bc5073","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-10-02-000010-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/gershkov-bic-dic-lean","tags":["econ.TH","cs.GT","msc:91A27","msc:91A10","msc:91B44","msc:03B35","mechanism-design","game-theory","lean-formalization"],"score":0,"title":"Finite Bayesian-to-Dominant-Strategy Equivalence","trust":"high","domain":"econ.TH","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos","David Barros Hulak","Ruy Jose Guerra Barretto de Queiroz"],"reviews":0,"subject":"econ.TH","summary":"Finite Gershkov–Goeree–Kushnir–Moldovanu–Shi (2013) Theorem 2 for arbitrary finite agents and alternatives, heterogeneous ordered finite scalar type supports, arbitrary independent positive support masses, and linear private values with nonnegative slopes and arbitrary constants. The library constructs a feasible dominant-strategy mechanism preserving every support type's interim expected utility and ex ante social surplus. Weighted monotone lifting is proved by a compact feasible quadratic minimizer and an improving perturbation. Adjacent transfer bounds imply full-report IC by telescoping.…","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"econ","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-10-02","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation","identifier":"","relationship":"formalizes"}]}