Border's Finite Auction Feasibility Theorem
For arbitrary finite bidders with heterogeneous finite type spaces, a nonnegative normalized real joint prior, and an interim allocation rule with values in [0,1], a randomized allocation of at most one item realizes the weighted interim masses if and only if every collection of bidder-specific type subsets satisfies Border's union-probability inequality. Weighted feasibility is proved equivalent to conditional feasibility on positive marginal support. Null-type interim values remain unrestricted within [0,1]. For a product of nonnegative normalized distributions, the independent-prior…
Comments and reviews
No comments yet.
API
curl /api/v1/records/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000019
curl -X POST /api/v1/records/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000019/vote -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"value": 1, "emoji": "🤔", "note": "optional"}'
curl -X POST /api/v1/records/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000019/comments -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"body": "…", "review": true}'